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Abstract Ought parents, in general, to value being biologically tied to their 
children? Is it important, in particular, that both parents be biologically tied to 
their children? I will address these fundamental questions by looking at a fairly 
new practice within IVF treatments, so-called IVF-with-ROPA (Reception of 
Oocytes from Partner), which allows lesbian couples to „share motherhood‟ with 
one partner providing the eggs while the other becomes pregnant. I believe that 
IVF-with-ROPA is, just like other IVF treatments, morally permissible; but here I 
argue that the increased biological ties which IVF-with-ROPA allows for do not 
have any particular value beside the satisfaction of a legitimate wish, because 
there is no intrinsic value in a biological tie between parents and children; 
further, I argue that equality within parental projects cannot be achieved by 
redistributing biological ties.  
 
Ought parents, in general, to value being biologically tied to their children? Is it important, 
in particular, that both parents be biologically tied to their children? I will address these 
fundamental questions by looking at a fairly new practice within IVF treatments, so-called 
IVF-with-ROPA (Reception of Oocytes from Partner) (1), which allows lesbian couples to 
„share motherhood‟ with one partner providing the eggs while the other becomes pregnant 
(2, 3, 4, 5). I believe that IVF-with-ROPA is, just like other IVF treatments, morally 
permissible (for an ethical defence of IVF-with-ROPA, which I will just assume, see (2, 5)); 
but here I argue that the increased biological ties which IVF-with-ROPA allows for do not 
have any particular value beside the satisfaction of a legitimate wish, because there is no 
intrinsic value in a biological tie between parents and children; further, I argue that equality 
within parental projects cannot be achieved by redistributing biological ties.  
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1. ROPA: Reception of Oocytes from Partner 
There are different reasons why a couple may want IVF-with-ROPA (I mean the following 
list to be representative of the diversity in circumstances and motivation rather than 
exhaustive): 
 
a. there may be some medical ground which either prevents the donating partner from 
becoming pregnant or makes it advisable that she not become pregnant; 
b. there may be some medical ground which either prevents the receiving partner from 
using her eggs or makes it advisable that she not do so – for example a known higher 
genetic risk;  
c. there may be non-strictly-medical reasons why the donating partner does not wish to 
become pregnant, such as trauma related to previous successful or unsuccessful 
pregnancies (if those issues affect the mental health of the donating partner, then this 
consideration will belong into group (a))1; 
d. a predicted lower success-rate in case the eggs of the receiving partner are used 
(again, here it may be argued that this kind of consideration really belongs to (b)); 
e. both partners may want to be biological parents of the child (it is standard in the 
literature to refer to both genetic parenthood and gestational parenthood as biological 
parenthood (5); I am going to follow that);  
(e1) the above wish may have to do with their future parental relations to their child or 
anyhow with the welfare of the future child; 
(e2) or it may have to do with their own relationship, so that they may not value a 
biological connection to the child per se but they may value not creating a possible 
imbalance in the relationship due to only one partner having a biological relationship to 
the child. Note that it is not necessarily unreasonable not to value biological parenthood 
while at the same time fearing that an asymmetry in biological parenthood may have 
consequences for the relationship, since reasons for the latter may have to do with 
factors external to the partners such as, say, prejudice or peer-pressure. There is in 
fact some evidence that both equality and jealousy are concerns (6, 7) – and I think this 
may be relevant for both (e1) and (e2); 
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 Age is another possible reason which may be medical but does not need to be – thanks to a referee for the 
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f. the couple may have a non-medical reason (say a reason of aesthetical taste) for not 
wanting to use the receiving partner‟s eggs. This may be either an absolute 
consideration or one which is only relative to the donating partner‟s eggs2; 
g. there may be non-medical reasons why the donating partner does not wish to become 
pregnant (just think of the non-medical reasons why someone may opt for surrogacy).3 
When considering these different motivations for wanting IVF-with-ROPA, we must keep in 
mind that there will be different alternatives depending on the particular circumstances. For 
example, surrogacy would be a viable alternative in the case of (a), (c), and (g); while non-
ROPA-IVF or just IUI (intrauterine insemination) may be a viable alternative to (b), (d), and 
(f).4 Further, adoption will be an alternative in all of these cases (even though some of 
these alternatives may not be desired, for example because of the wish to become a 
biological parent in the case of adoption).   
 
Looking at the different circumstances which may lead to IVF-with-ROPA, I can see two 
extremes: on the one hand, there may be a very difficult medical situation of partner Anne 
not being able to provide her eggs while partner Beth is not able to become pregnant, 
which would leave just enough room for IVF-with-ROPA; even though that would not be 
the only alternative (egg donation would be an alternative, with Anne gestating; also, 
surrogacy would be an alternative, with Beth‟s eggs; adoption would also be an option).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum we could have the following case: there are no medical 
issues with either Carol or Denise, neither in terms of their capacity to become genetic 
parents nor with their capacity to become gestational parents; still, Carol has some 
physical trait such that the couple, for aesthetic reasons, does not want to run the risk of 
that trait being passed on to their offspring; while Denise (or the couple) fears the wage 
loss related to her gestation. Again, IVF-with-ROPA would just do the job in this case too 
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 This last point is important because it makes a difference in terms of which alternatives to IVF-with-ROPA 
may be available given the particular preferences.  
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 Of course in real life a couple‟s motivation for wanting IVF-with-ROPA will be more like a mix of the above 
considerations, including the partners having different reasons or weighing their reasons differently; the real-
life case illustrated in (5) does a good job of showing these kinds of added complications. Also, see (8, 9) for 
how social gender may be a reason for not wanting to become pregnant in lesbian couples – again thanks to 
a referee for this suggestion. 
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while, again, the same alternatives available for Anne and Beth would also be open to 
Carol and Denise. 
 
The difference between surrogacy, egg donation, and adoption on the one hand and IVF-
with-ROPA on the other hand is exactly that only IVF-with-ROPA offers the possibility of a 
biological connection to both parents (at least in the context of same-sex relationships5). 
There is also something that all of these practices have in common: there will always be 
some other biological connection external to the parental project, whether one goes for 
surrogacy (one gestational relationship external to the parental project), egg donation (two 
genetic relationships external to the parental project), adoption (normally but not 
necessarily, one genetic and one genetic/gestational relationship external to the parental 
project), or IVF-with-ROPA (one genetic relationship external to the parental project). 
 
The two sets of somewhat extreme circumstances I have illustrated point to a significant 
divide within IVF-with-ROPA: namely that there can be either medical reasons (in a broad 
sense meant to also include most cases of (c) and (d)) to request this particular treatment 
or non-medical reasons to request IVF-with-ROPA. Within this broad divide, I would 
include the wish to have a biological connection to one‟s children within the non-medical 
reasons to want IVF-with-ROPA.  
 
Wanting to have a biological connection (either genetic or gestational) to one‟s children is, 
I claim, a legitimate wish – but only in terms of individual liberty; there is no deeper 
meaning to it than that, as I will argue below. The language of positive and negative rights 
may help illustrate this point: wanting to have a biological connection to one‟s children is 
legitimate, so the state ought not to interfere with it; but, having no deeper meaning than 
liberty, the state may not be obliged to support this wish by, say, paying for it.  
 
In the next two sections I offer my argument against the intrinsic value of biological ties, in 
two steps: firstly I criticize a recent influential argument by the philosopher J. David 
                                                          
5
 Here again I am discounting the possibility of mitochondrial replacement. Also, I am not claiming that this is 
the only difference between ROPA and these other possibilities, just the one I focus on in this paper. Other 
aspects may include, for example in the case of surrogacy, the fact that many couples would hesitate on 
surrogacy because they do not want another woman to take on the risk of going through pregnancy, and 
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Velleman for the value of biological ties and then I offer a positive argument for the claim 
that biological ties, and their redistribution, ought not to be valued.   
 
2. The Value of Biological Ties 
Velleman has recently argued that biological ties are meaningful (10): indeed, Velleman 
takes their meaning to be so significant that “people who create children by donor 
conception already know – or already should know – that their children will be 
disadvantaged by the lack of a basic good on which most people rely in their pursuit of 
self-knowledge and identity formation (10: 364-365). Velleman concludes that the practice 
of what he calls „donor conception‟ is morally wrong and that “other things being equal, 
children should be raised by their biological parents” (10: 362).  
 
Before assessing the merits of Velleman‟s argument, let me note its peculiar dialectical 
relationship to our discussion: Velleman‟s argument can be both used to argue in support 
of IVF-with-ROPA as far as IVF-with-ROPA is a way for both intentional parents to be 
biologically tied to their children but it could also be used to argue against IVF-with-ROPA 
as far as it requires donated sperm by someone outside the parental project.6 Also, there 
is an asymmetry between Velleman‟s argument for the importance of biological ties for the 
identity of children and our discussion of the importance of biological ties for parents: as 
we have seen in the distinction between (e1) and (e2), the wish for biological ties may not 
necessarily be motivated by something related to the future child but it may have solely to 
do with the prospective parents or with their relationship to each other. 
 
Velleman‟s reasons for thinking that biological ties are meaningful have to do with the role 
that he assigns to family history for a person‟s identity. Velleman offers a plausible account 
of how having some access to one‟s ancestors is important for self-understanding. What I 
find less plausible is Velleman‟s insistence that what is identity-forming isn‟t just access to 
one‟s family history but rather access to a biological history which is identical to one‟s 
family history: that he motivates by appeal to “the resemblances that hold within biological 
families” (10: 376).  
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Whether or not one thinks that such family resemblances are identity-forming or anyhow 
meaningful, the important point to make against Velleman is that biological families are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for identity-forming family resemblances. Upbringing may 
not just be sufficiently identity-forming, but it may be so exactly in virtue of the family 
resemblances emphasized by Velleman: namely, one‟s inevitable family resemblances to 
one‟s intentional parents and siblings which result from common upbringing, habits, 
values. At the same time, biological resemblances may not result in anything significant 
enough to be identity-forming. Take one of Velleman‟s own examples: knowing my parents 
and how my parents have brought me up and knowing their parents and how their parents 
brought them up may have significant repercussions for how I bring my own children up. 
One can readily agree with this without any appeal to biological ties. 
 
I must say I am also unmoved by Velleman‟s appeal to the fact that “about 50%” (12) of 
adopted persons will search for their biological parents at some point in their life. Firstly, 
those numbers aren‟t very significant, as about 50% never search for their biological 
parents either, then. Secondly, the case of adoption has the peculiarity that it points to a 
particular event in the person‟s life (having been abandoned or anyhow having been given 
up for adoption, for example) and not just to their biological history. Finally, there is the 
issue of many adopted persons finding out, at some point in their life, that their history is 
different from the one they had either been told or imagined – and this again may lead to 
some „searching‟ which would not be necessarily motivated by biological considerations. 
So, again, Velleman may be right that history is important to someone‟s identity and the 
adoption data may even point to that (even though it is, in fairness, evenly spilt); but that 
would again not imply that biological history is particularly important. 
 
Summing up my argument against Velleman, I am sympathetic to his account of how 
access to one‟s family history is important for identity and self-knowledge; but I think that 
the narrative significance of such access does not depend on the family being one‟s 
biological family.7  
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So far I have only been offering negative arguments by criticizing Velleman‟s claim that 
biological ties are meaningful. I now want to offer a more substantial argument to the 
extent that biological ties ought not to be meaningful to the prospective parents. I think it 
would be morally reproachable for a parent to love their child less should they find out that 
– for whatever reason – the child was not biologically tied to them. And this applies to 
genetic parenthood as much as gestation: it is similarly morally reproachable for fathers in 
traditional contexts to love their children less than their mothers do because they have not 
gestated them.8 
 
Here it may be objected that it is similarly both psychologically implausible and morally 
reproachable for a parent to love their child less should the child lose a leg but that this 
does quite clearly not imply that the parent ought not to have a preference for a two-legged 
child in the first place. This is true, but one would hope that the parent‟s reason to prefer a 
two-legged child is related to the child‟s welfare rather than the parent‟s or her ability to 
love a one-legged child.  
 
3. Fairness within Parental Projects and Biological Ties 
The following objection could be raised against my argument here: I have only argued that 
there is no intrinsic value in parents‟ biological ties to their children; even if my argument is 
successful in showing that there is no particular value in a parent‟s wish to be biologically 
connected to her children, one may still defend the added value of IVF-with-ROPA on the 
grounds that it allows for a more equal relationship or parental project in distributing 
biological ties more equally than, say, a traditional IVF with both eggs and gestation by the 
same partner (or, for that matter, either surrogacy or egg donation where, at best, again 
only one partner has biological ties – note that the inclusive nature of the disjunction 
„surrogacy v egg donation‟ also allows for a scenario where no partner has a biological tie 
to the child).  
 
As I have mentioned, there is some empirical evidence that these and similar concerns 
(even jealousy) play a role in some parental projects (6, 7). I respect those preoccupations 
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and I am wholeheartedly in favour of more balanced parental projects (16), but I think this 
particular way of striving for more balanced parental projects is self-defeating because I 
am afraid that worries about inequalities or imbalances within a relationship that are due to 
differences in the biological ties of the partners to their children are patriarchal in nature, 
as they are likely mirrored on roles within traditional families where – let us not forget – 
there are also differences in the biological ties of the partners to their children, as only one 
partner is the gestational parent.  
 
Our commitment to equality, then, is exactly what should make us skeptical of this appeal 
to biological ties based on patriarchal prejudices about how biological ties affect role-
distribution and power-imbalances within a family.  
 
A parental project cannot be liberated from the patriarchal norm by trying to redistribute the 
very phenomenon, biological ties, which is consistently used to reinforce our patriarchal 
status-quo: rather, liberation requires the establishment of fair and equal parental projects 
where biological ties do not play any role in the distribution of roles, responsibility, and 
ultimately power.  
 
We see now that there is a further general consequence relevant to all parental projects 
arising from our discussion of IVF-with-ROPA, on top of what we have already said about 
the value of parents‟ biological ties with their children. The second general element is this: 
a difference in biological ties within the parental project should not affect the parents‟ 
relations to their children nor the parents‟ own relationship; it should not affect, in short, 
what we have referred to as the distribution of roles, responsibility and power within the 
family. To put it very simply: women in traditional contexts ought not to be taking on a 
greater burden (or even just a greater role) within the parental project simply in virtue of 
the fact that they have a biological tie to the children (genetics plus gestation) that men in 
traditional contexts do not have (only genetics).  
 
I have now completed my argument. Summing up, I have argued that there is no added 
value in IVF-with-ROPA coming from its redistribution of biological ties because, first, there 
is no intrinsic value in parents‟ biological ties to their children; and, second, because role-
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distribution within parental projects ought to be free from biological considerations. But 
there is one final worry that I want to briefly deal with: namely that failing to acknowledge 
the added value of IVF-with-ROPA constitutes a form of discrimination against same-sex 
couples. But here I have neither argued that there is something morally wrong with IVF-
with-ROPA nor have I argued that it ought not to be legal. In fact, I think that IVF-with-
ROPA ought to be morally permissible and also legal; and indeed I do fear that countries 
(such as for example Sweden (7)) which allow for traditional IVF but not for IVF-with-
ROPA may be guilty of both incoherence and discrimination towards same-sex couples: 
this is because they preclude some same-sex couples from satisfying a legitimate wish 
towards biological ties with their children which is readily available for different-sex 
couples. On the other hand I do not think that it amounts to discrimination to argue, as I 
have done here, that IVF-with-ROPA does not constitute added value by virtue of its 
redistribution of biological ties.9 
 
4. Conclusion 
IVF-with-ROPA, where within lesbian couples one partner provides the egg while the other 
becomes pregnant, opens up the possibility of sharing biological ties to children within 
same-sex couples. Here I have looked at whether biological ties to children in general and 
their sharing between parents in particular are intrinsically valuable and I have argued that 
neither is: briefly, family history, as Velleman has argued, may be important to a person‟s 
identity and self-knowledge, but its importance is independent from the family being one‟s 
biological family. Also, biological ties ought not to play any role in the distribution of 
burdens and power within parental projects. A final word: we should welcome IVF-with-
ROPA because it offers a new possibility to fulfill a very human wish but we should be 
careful not to end up thereby reinforcing patriarchal prejudices about the importance of 
biology.10 
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 Therefore one may argue that the state should, in general, not be paying for whatever extra resources IVF-
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